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RECENT CASES
STATUTORY OFFICERS-POWER TO REMOVE
SAMUEL WANT *
State of South Carolina, ex rel. J. Stanley Williamson v.
L. Banks Wannamaker, et al. (the respondents comprising the
State Highway Commission of South Carolina together with
the Chief Highway Commissioner), Westbrook's Advance
Sheets, May 22, 1948, hews a new line across the realm of law
dealing with the power of public agencies to terminate the
employment of a subordinate who was appointed under stat-
utory direction for a stated number of years.
The case arose out of the action of the State Highway
Commission in removing from office the Chief Highway Com-
missioner. This office is created by Section 5868 of the Code.
Under the statute the Commission is "authorized and directed
to appoint a Chief Highway Commissioner." His term of office
is fixed at four years, and the statute provides that "the right
to remove or discharge the Chief Highway Commissioner is
hereby reserved to the members of the State Highway Com-
mission, or a majority thereof."
The Chief Highway Commissioner involved in this case
was removed by a majority vote of the Commission. No for-
mal charges were made against him, and no hearing was held
to afford the official an opportunity to absolve himself from
guilt of any charge that might be made. On the other hand,
the Commission gave as its sole reason for the removal, its
belief that the best interests of the South Carolina Highway
Department would be subserved by terminating the tenure
of the person then holding the office.
It will be perceived that no provision is made in the gov-
erning statute for the making of formal charges or the hold-
ing of a hearing; as technically expressed the statute con-
tains no language indicating that removal may be effected
only "for cause."
In this suit brought by the Chief Highway Commissioner
against the Highway Commission and the newly appointed
Chief Highway Commissioner, the petitioner sought a ju-
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dicial declaration that his term of office was fixed for four
years from the date of his appointment, and that the Commis-
sion was without power to remove or discharge him, except
for legal cause, after a hearing at which he would have the
right and opportunity to be heard in defense of whatever
charges were made against him.
The respondents demurred to the complaint, resting their
main position upon the absence from the governing statute
of any limitation or restriction on the power of removal or
discharge of the Chief Highway Commissioner. In the Cir-
cuit Court the demurrer was sustained.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that the action of
the Highway Commission was without warrant of law. The
effect of the decision is that where a public official is appoint-
ed for a stated number of years, with the reservation of the
right of removal or discharge by the appointing power, the
exercise of this right is conditioned upon the making of for-
mal charges and the holding of a public hearing conformable
with the usual requisites of due process in the constitutional
sense. The Court further held that this view of the matter
was not altered by the fact that the Chief Highway Commis-
sioner is merely an administrative officer, without power to
bind the Commission except to the extent of acting on its be-
half during the intervals between Commission meetings, at
which all acts of the Chief Highway Commissioner are re-
quired by the statute to be ratified and approved.
After holding that the statute does not authorize summary
removal of the Chief Highway Commissioner either in ex-
press language or by necessary implication, the Court con-
cluded that in any event its duty was to seek the intention
of the legislature in the enactment of Section 5868, and that
if this intention is deemed to be a matter of doubt, the doubt
should be resolved against the existence of the power. In this
aspect of the matter the Court held that there was doubt as
to the legislative intention, demanding the granting of the re-
lief prayed.
In an earlier case' the Supreme Court had held that
where State dispensary directors were appointed under a
statute providing for a two year term, "unless sooner removed
by the Governor", it was within the power of the governor
1. State v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. E. 185, 11 Ann. Cas. 618.
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to summarily discharge the director without giving any rea-
son for such action, and without the making of charges or
the holding of a hearing. This case, however, was distinguished
by the Court on the ground that the language, "unless sooner
removed by the Governor", had the effect of cutting down
the definite term stated in the statute to an indefinite term,
dependent wholly upon the will of the governor, and this
was found not to be the case with the language of Section
5868 of the Code, wherein the power of the Commission is
stated simply as a power "to remove or discharge." This lan-
guage was held not to reduce the term of office to an indefi-
nite basis.
The decision adopts for this State for the first time the
definite and controlling principle that where the term of of-
fice of a public official is fixed by statute, even though a power
to remove or discharge is reserved, the term may not be cut
down by summary action of the removing power; but that
where the language fixing the term, as in the dispensary
case hereinbefore cited, has the effect of removing the ele-
ment of definiteness from the term of office, and of therefore
making the term indefinite, the reserved power to remove
or discharge is not conditioned upon the making of charges
and the holding of a hearing.
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